Emerging Markets Debt in a Trump 2.0 World

Greg Campion: Arguably the single largest factor impacting global markets right now and for the foreseeable future is the second administration of President Donald Trump, AKA Trump 2.0. Of course, the pace of executive orders and actions to date has been dizzying, the headlines have been nonstop, and the impacts are rippling across the world. So how can investors in emerging markets debt or any risk asset class keep up?

Ricardo Adrogue: One thing is clear is that the US has been disengaging from the world, and that has been taking a while. And sorry to go back to history again, but when Britain or the UK disengaged from the world was when we had the first World War, and the second one finally the US showed that it was the dominant power. And so a US disengaging from the world is opening the door for the kids to start messing things up, and that's basically what we're seeing. And so how far the kids will want to mess things up is the question whether China will take Taiwan or they will wait.

Greg Campion: That was Ricardo Adrogue, head of Global Sovereign Debt and Currencies at Barings, and this is Streaming Income- A Podcast From Barings. Coming up on the show, Emerging Markets Debt under Trump 2. 0 World. Before we get into the conversation, if you're not already following us and you're interested in hearing our latest thoughts on asset classes like high yield, private credit, real estate, and more, just search" Streaming Income" on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. With that, here's my conversation with Ricardo Adrogue and Cem Karacadag. All right, Ricardo, Cem, welcome back to Streaming Income.

Ricardo Adrogue: Great to be here, Greg.

Cem Karacadag: Great to be here.

Greg Campion: Last to talk about today, I think what we're going to try to do with this conversation at least is we're going to hopefully provide something quite valuable for listeners, and that's to put some context around what is really a relentless flow of headlines at the moment on all things macroeconomic and geopolitical. And so whether you're watching TV, whether you're looking at Bloomberg screens, the pace of the headlines has really been something to behold. And what I'm interested in talking about is how do you put that all into context, and then how do you invest in such an environment? So let's start with rates. So Ricardo, what are you thinking is kind of the most likely path for rates, and then what are you kind of watching for to tell us which direction we're heading there?

Ricardo Adrogue: So I think that the current situation is one in which the whole world is getting an adrenaline shock by President Trump, and that tends to be pro- growth despite the fact that quite a few of his policies, especially the tariffs, by putting barriers to trade, that is negative for growth. But the whole idea of creating a stronger US through the deregulation and the tariffs, and his push to have countries try to stand on their own is at the end of the day very positive for growth, and therefore it could potentially put a limit to the downtrend in inflation. And so it's difficult to envision rates going much lower. If I have to position myself, I would be very careful with those that continue to think that the Fed will have room to cut. The inflation numbers have been coming in reasonably well despite some hiccups, but when you look forward, there is enough in the system. The US economy is close to overheating and the policies are unlikely to help cool off. And the fact that Trump has removed support for Europe is calling for Europe to really start investing, start spending, start gathering together, and that is potentially the one silver lining. The US and the US states, which when there were colonies, they decided to become one nation because they had a really big force that was opposing them, the King of England. In this case, the US by withdrawing support for Europe, could potentially has the same effect, have a Europe that is more united and that it stands on its own, and it is a little bit what we saw happen on the first presidency of President Trump. And so that's potentially a good silver lining, good growth, but from a rates perspective, it's unlikely to see rates going significantly lower from here.

Greg Campion: Okay. I'm curious what you think about that, Cem, as well, because I know there is a lot of concern out there too on tariffs and tariffs leading to inflation. If I'm interpreting you correctly, Ricardo, maybe you're less worried about that, but what do you guys think about that?

Ricardo Adrogue: Yeah, I'm not so concerned about the tariffs themselves leading to inflation. Tariffs could have a one- off effect on some prices, but it's more the general attitude towards promoting growth. So if you hear President Trump carefully, you realize that he's a president that really wants to have the world, and the US in particular, on a different stage, a much stronger economic stage. He puts a lot of other things on a second level, on less important considerations. He wants to have more oil so that there's more energy, so that the world, and specifically the US, grow faster. He wants to have Europe stand on its own and spend on armament, defend themselves. So he wants to end the war in Ukraine to try to get the peace in the world that is needed to get the world again to a greater economic outcome. So there is the potential of a good silver lining in the very difficult period that we're facing from announcements perspective.

Greg Campion: Cem, how does all that strike you? Do you agree with Ricardo's assertions on rates and tariffs?

Cem Karacadag: I would pick up on a few. The point about oil supply increasing and potentially putting downward pressure on oil prices, we shouldn't forget would be an awesome thing for the world. Energy is something the world needs to produce, and to consume, and would be helpful for inflation, so that would be a very positive side effect of that, of Trump's energy policy. With respect to tariffs, I'm not worried at all. To be honest, even though that makes a lot of noise, a few data points to consider. If you think about the countries that have large trade surpluses with the US, China$ 300 billion, Europe$ 230, Mexico$ 170 billion. If you take China and Europe, those amounts are very small compared to their GDP's, 2% in the case of China, 1.5% of GDP in the case of Europe. So even though there's a lot of noise made about that, those are not the kinds of things that are going to move the needle too much with respect to the soundness or the fundamentals of economic performance frankly of either large economy, China or Europe. Mexico was one vulnerable country that may be the most vulnerable to US aggressive trade policies with 10% of GDP in terms of its surplus with the US. But even there, this is a $1. 5 trillion economy, Mexico. It can take a few percentage points of GDP shock, the Mexican Peso was already more than adjusted, it's Depreciated 17% or so in the past 12 months. Under- performed 10 percentage points, most out of the EM currencies, so a lot of that's priced in relative price adjustments, a little bit of slower growth. So from a credit perspective, I don't worry frankly too much about some of the things or most of the things that make headlines. The last point I would make on and is with respect to inflation is that it is very important that the Fed in particular, but the rest of the world, get a handle on inflation because that is ultimately the rock upon which fixed income is built. We want a stable inflationary environment so that nominal yields can be stable, and of course we need riskless nominal yields to have stability. The spreads are built on those for that to have stability and for credit to perform, so I do worry a little bit about the world economy led by the US overheating and inflation continuing to be a problem. Hopefully not, but we need that to get back under control so we have a solid bedrock, meaning the riskless yields upon which we can comfortably invest in credit spreads.

Greg Campion: Ricardo, how worried should we be that the quote" Riskless or risk- free rate" really isn't riskless or risk- free at all?

Ricardo Adrogue: So I think we're already there. To be totally frank, one of the things that an emerging market investor has to keep in mind is that in the past we used to think emerging markets trying to reach out towards the type of infrastructure that the US has, and in this case I'm talking about legal infrastructure, about institutions, and I'm not talking specifically about President Trump, I'm talking about the way the elections have been going into the US in the past few cycles. There's a clear social challenge on the institutions that formed the US. Some of the policies that President Trump is implementing, but also President Biden has passed, released our challenge in the basic institutional infrastructure of the US, and that is a key consideration that we take into consideration when we compare countries, when we look at countries. And that's potentially the biggest relative positive that I can find in the world, that the US has shown to be just one more country. It has large fiscal deficits, but that itself is not the key risk, and I would highly recommend people read an article in the Financial Times by Acemoglu where he says, " Well, the decadence happens when the institutions basically break apart." And he's somebody that has followed why countries are successful and why countries are not. I would make one final point. What I perceive in the US today and I've refused to see, it is my adopted country, I became nationalized US citizen, and what I perceive is that it is very similar to what the UK, what Great Britain went in the early 20th century, that once you cease to be competitive, once you cease to lead the world, you start using your muscle to push other countries around to try to get the final cup that you can get from the rest of the world. And so that in itself is from an investment perspective, everybody thinks US exceptionalism, I'm starting to see decadence and more of an even playing field, and from an investment perspective, a much more attractive space for emerging markets.

Greg Campion: Wow. Okay, that to me sounds like you're making the, we're late in the days of the empire call here with some of that rhetoric. Well, let's turn the attention some of these geopolitical situations that are going on. Cem, you mentioned Russia and Ukraine, of course we've had the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza. Let's talk a little bit about this. What I want to understand is how all this impacts the landscape, especially for your area, which is kind of sovereign debt, emerging market debt, et cetera. So let's talk a little bit about that because even in the last several weeks, it's been pretty eye- opening just to see the shifting alliances, I would say. And it seems like they say decades happen in weeks sometimes and things like that, but it seems like just in the past few weeks alone, all of a sudden the US- Russia dynamic has been completely reshaped to the US- Europe dynamic, which has been such a steadfast, reliable, known entity in the world for so long, is being questioned. So to me, I wonder if I'm sitting in an institutional investor's chair and I say, " Okay, wow, a lot of uncertainty has just been injected onto the global stage here in terms of the world order and it seems like things are getting reshuffled." Doesn't that make things inherently dangerous for investing in some of the markets that you guys specialize in? How would you approach that one cem, you want to start out on that one?

Cem Karacadag: Sure. It's a tough one. So on the one hand, we've been living for example with the Russia- Ukraine conflict for some time already as well as the one in the Middle East, and to a great extent, they are localized. So obviously it has investment implications for the countries at hand. There are sanctions on Russia, Ukraine is obviously going through a difficult period, it just restructured its debt. And then in the immediate surrounding, whether it's the former CIS Republics, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, or if you go further and go to Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, et cetera, they're investable, they're peaceful, they're stable spaces, of course there are tail risks with respect to what Russia may or may not do, and then of course if you branch out to other emerging markets, whether it's Latin America, Caribbean, Sub- Saharan Africa, there are plenty of opportunities to exploit and we have been doing so. With respect to what you just referenced, and that is again, the changing norms where all of a sudden the traditional alliances don't seem to be intact, where we don't have common standards anymore, we don't know what the rules are or maybe we're in the world that Ricardo is beginning to describe, where the strongest at the moment is wins but of course then it's only the strongest that rule at a certain point in time, and that can change depending on the day, on the year, on the decade as opposed to having the World War II order that we established, the UN, the multilateral institutions, the Washington Consensus policies where we try to form alliances based on certain principles and so forth, and we try to bring other countries to follow those norms of freedom of expression, freedom of choice, and thinking that those are the right institutions, the checks and balances, the self- correcting mechanisms, et cetera. So I do worry that we're migrating towards a standard list, a less predictable world, and that's where I was getting to with respect to the transactional approach. And part of the problem, which is why I don't feel terribly comfortable even making" Forecast" because is Trump transactional, and is he taking particularly extreme positions, whether his position in the Middle East or on Ukraine, in order to land somewhere in the middle, but we don't know where he's trying to land, or is this a permanent, do we now have a U.S.- Russia alliance? Is this the new world in which we live and the reality we have to navigate? I don't have an answer to that. So then you're left with investing, exploring investment opportunities in the spaces where you think are not directly in the line of fire. So in this case, if we're talking about if the US- Russia Alliance, for example, is one that's more permanent at the expense of Ukraine, clearly that has very negative implications for Ukraine in the long term, but that's singularly focused on Ukraine for example. So in the case of the Middle East, if Trump really means that the Gaza population will be displaced and be forced upon other countries in the region, example is Jordan and Egypt, at least that's his opening position. If that really that type of pressure were to mount, then that has negative implications, particularly not only for the Gazans of course, Palestinians, but also for Jordan and Egypt. Relatively localized, but it also creates long- term uncertainty with respect to international relations. What are the implications of that kind of behavior for China's posture towards Taiwan, and so forth? Those are the kinds of cans of worms that it opens up for the future.

Greg Campion: Ricardo, I know you want to jump in on this one.

Ricardo Adrogue: Yeah, so a few things that following up on what Jim mentioned. The one thing is clear is that the US has been disengaging from the world and that has been taking a while. Sorry to go back to history again, but when Britain or the UK disengaged from the world was when we had the World War I, and the second one, finally the US showed that it was the dominant power. And so the US disengaging from the world is opening the door for the kids to start messing things up, and that's basically what we're seeing. And so how far the kids will want to mess things up is the question whether China will take Taiwan or they will wait, so that's one point. The other one I would highlight is that when we tend to think about investment, even in the case of worst case scenarios, and I'm taking not the worst case scenario that I described, but assuming that President Trump follows through with all his policies towards taxing, and tariffs, and all of it and closing USAID and all of it, one can and we do have the information and we have analyzed information, the data, on what is the actual power that the US has over the different countries in the world. And one simply can say there's basically four channels in which the US affects country. One is through trade, so if the US has a trade deficit with the country, then the US has the upper hand. Another channel is through remittances that come from the US, the third channel is through aid, which is quite significant, and the fourth channel is through the assets, financial assets that countries have on the US, so US treasuries, US equities. And so when you actually look at the world from that angle, you'll be surprised. Countries that are really exposed, where the US does have the upper hand, is clearly Mexico, as Cem mentioned, China to much lesser degree but the US does have significant powers there, and Canada, those are primarily the three countries. Then to a lesser extent some Central American countries, but then it's almost gone the power that the US has, unless the US wants to start taxing those holders of US assets, in which case it's the more developed countries, the ones that have savings. So it's the Europeans, the Koreans, the Japanese, those that have big savings in the US in financial assets. If the US were to say, " Okay, I want to use all my financial muscle." They could impose a tax, a 25% tax on any foreign holdings of S& P 500. So where are the EM countries in this space? A lot of EM countries are from this angle, very, very safe, and the world is trying to think, " This is all bad for EM countries." Actually, when you dissect the data from this angle, I'm not talking about the worst- case scenario, I'm talking a plausible, bad, really bad scenario, the EM countries are still very good investment.

Greg Campion: That's encouraging, I would say, to hear that. I think that's a good transition, Ricardo, so let's talk a little bit more detail. And I know that you and the team have done kind of a quantitative analysis on what you just described, so sort of looking at the exposures of different EM countries to the US and to tariffs, etc. And I think the results, as you've just described, have been probably more encouraging than maybe most people would think. So let's transition, let's talk a little bit about with this very uncertain macro backdrop, let's talk a little bit about how you then translate that to the investment process, how you translate that to running diversified portfolios of emerging market debt, and rates and currencies, etc. So let's talk about that. So maybe as a starting point, just to remind our listeners, if you look back at 2024, it was kind of a year where the lower quality names rallied and performed really well. Triple Cs, I believe Argentina and Ecuador accounted for something like 30% of sovereign debt index performance. So we come into 2025, and this is not just emerging market debt, this is fixed income broadly, but we come into 2025, credit spreads are very tight, there's a lot of questions being asked on can they go tighter from here or not, but we look across and we see equity valuations are arguably rich as well. So let's start there, Ricardo, tell me just how you think about that coming into 2025, how you're thinking about where credit spreads are and what that means for the investment environment?

Ricardo Adrogue: So I would characterize, and I will let Cem also jump in, I would characterize what we have seen in 2024 as those countries that look not as bad started rallying. So the countries that were going through restructurings, and those restructurings look to be successful, then they're pricing that restructure. Countries that had their economic changes like Ecuador or Argentina, and those were meaningful economic changes that resulted in meaningful adjustments and the market realized those. Now we are all the way to the bottom, we're looking for countries like Lebanon or Venezuela, which in the case of Lebanon, there has been a change but the country is quite bankrupt. When you actually look at the claims and the capacity the country has to pay, even in the best case scenario, it's very difficult to make sense of current bond prices. And Venezuela, there hasn't even been change, but the market is starting to think, " Oh, maybe there's something there." So bottom line I would say it;s very difficult to have in 2025, a repeat of 2024. What we have seen in 2024 was a catch- up by some very bad cases that were turned out to be known as bad. We need true change in 2025 for that to continue in those countries that did well in 2024 and in countries like Venezuela that hasn't seen any change. That would be my first reaction. I don't know if Cem.

Cem Karacadag: No, I think that's perfect. I would also add to the list not just Argentina and Ecuador, where, as Ricardo says, the change that has happened and has been sustained for about a year or so, so far, still has to prove itself to be enduring, and we're certainly not out of the woods in Ecuador and frankly not even in Argentina yet, and so much has been priced in with bond prices around 70, high 60s for both of these countries. In addition to those two last year, we had countries that like Zambia, Ghana, and Sri Lanka also get resolved, they realized quite a bit of upside as well, and Ukraine's debt, which was the one that was not in default because debt service was suspended until September and then they restructured, the bond prices of Ukraine also went up a lot last year in anticipation of a ceasefire this year. So all of that happened in 2024, which is it's a virtual impossibility for 2024 in the Triple Cs space, Triple D or dead and default space to repeat itself in 2025. The two cases are the ones that Ricardo mentioned, Venezuela and Lebanon, and they are truly more difficult cases to figure out, very unique cases. The last point I would make, you made a reference about spreads being too tight, and I would simply disagree with that in the sense that a good chunk of the space is Double Bs, and of course investment grade and Single Bs as well, and they're spread still comfortably overstate default risk. There are countries, some of them are positively trending, so there's opportunity for spread compression in many countries. So we happen to actually be long credit risk, but more through the better quality high yield like Double Bs as opposed to fishing at the very bottom.

Greg Campion: Good point. Sometimes looking at just that headline credit spread number can be a little bit deceptive. You mentioned default risk and fixed income generally is a game of kind of avoiding losing money as opposed to taking big swings. Is that your basic philosophy when it comes to EMD, and I guess so how do you and the team think about kind of avoiding defaults, Cem?

Cem Karacadag: Well, I, glad you raised that because the market's traditional definition of risk is volatility, and it's not the risk that we emphasize the most. We're happy for our portfolios to be volatile, so long as we have confidence in the portfolios that we've constructed, the countries we've invested in, and we're confident in the direction of travel, so to speak. So the risk at hand is the one precisely the one that you reference, which is risk of permanent credit loss through default, so that is the risk that we manage too. Our approach to that is one that it is a very fundamental and in- depth process where we really want to give the investor the capital that we're putting at risk, good credit- risk reward. That is our main goal, if we're going to take risk, we want it to be commensurate with the reward and we don't want to just shoot for the reward part of the equation. That's sort of our approach, not just to buy something because it's in the index, but buy something because it's worth putting capital at risk and the chances of permanent losses are low to nil is what we shoot for.

Greg Campion: And how are you feeling about what's that default risk picture?

Cem Karacadag: So much lower today than it was? We have to remind ourselves, first of all, defaults in general, especially for sovereigns, are really big deals. They're pretty cataclysmic events. They affect the entire country, they affect all the nominal variables in the country, by which I mean the exchange rate, nominal interest rates, inflation, all of those three fundamental nominal variables that people live by day by day are affected when the country gets into a situation of defaults, so they're really big deals. Then you might say, " Well gee, there's been a whole lot of them lately," and you would be right, there have been, but if you actually parse it a little bit, you'll see that one of them, Venezuela was in the making for a long period of time and actually happened in 2017. Then if you parse it further, you'll see that a couple of them are serial defaulters, Ecuador and Argentina, which just happened to fall into default yet again in'19 and '20 respectively. And then we had the two crises, 2020, the Covid 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which created a cascade effect of another five plus defaults, of course we had Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, then we had Ghana, and Zambia tag on, and Sri Lanka in 2022. So that's what it took to generate the defaults that we have seen. Also, an important point to highlight is that during this period, the IMF in particular, but multilateral financial institutions in general, had a policy of trying to be very sympathetic to too much debt and debt restructuring or debt relief being an appropriate way to restore debt sustainability. So they actually encouraged defaults, and this policy after realizing how difficult it is to not only default but get out of defaults, the multilateral agencies and the IMF in particular really, I believe, changed their stance on this and they are not as willing to encourage defaults as a way out of a crisis. So you see IMF programs encourage adjustments even through tougher times in order to avoid defaults, that's a good thing. And lastly, the state of the world is very unlikely to give us those combination of shocks in that proximity to generate another round of default. So I do think default risk in the near term is much lower than what we've seen in the past few years.

Greg Campion: All right, we're going to bring this discussion to a close here. Before we go, can I get each of your one- minute bowl cases on EM sovereign's for Cem and EM local for Ricardo? Cem, you ready to fire away on that?

Cem Karacadag: Sure. Well first I'll start with the riskless rate and I'd love to see inflation stability and US and Europe yield stability, just to start with that being the rock. And then, honestly, I don't need a bull case, I don't need to say the bull case is the one we have in the sense that is the one that I said earlier. I mean default risk is overpriced in the vast majority of the space. I sleep very well investing in the sovereigns that we invest, I think the return is good, the spreads are very comfortably overcompensate, you can find pockets of spread compression. So when I do the total return, I don't have a hard time envisioning provided the riskless yield does not go up further high single digit return because, between the riskless yield of the 4. 5, 5 plus 200, 300 basis points in spread and some yields compression, I get some capital appreciation too. That's what we're doing, and I don't call that the bull case, I would call it my base case.

Greg Campion: All right. And I will remind listeners that we're not guaranteeing returns or predicting very specific returns here, but it is interesting to hear how you are thinking about that and how you can get to that in using some of those assumptions. Ricardo, he just said that for EM sovereign debt, his bull case is that he does not need a bull case. That's kind of hard to match, what do you have to say about that, EM local?

Ricardo Adrogue: He beat me there, I do have a bull case. Real rates in emerging markets, real rates adjusted by inflation are incredibly high, and the external accounts in most of these emerging markets are very, very sound. They have actually adjusted again, I stopped saying it because several years ago I said it and they adjusted and then they unadjusted, but they're in very good shape, the balance of payments are very strong. So there's no underlying reason other than fear for keeping the currencies at current levels. As soon as fear eases a little bit, emerging market currencies should appreciate. And so we have very attractive real yields in emerging markets, which our nominal interest rates very high compared to their inflation. Emerging markets has not had the same type of inflation problem that the US and some of the developed market had, and on top of that, you have currencies that are being held here cheap for fear. I don't know when it's going to materialize, but it is an asset class that we should stop avoiding.

Greg Campion: Okay, I love it. And we didn't even really get into discussions of all the diversification benefits and pushing out your efficient frontier and everything else that comes with these asset classes. So I think it is a very interesting time to be considering all things kind of EM debt. Before I let you guys go, I want to ask you the last, last question. I think a lot of our listeners are probably as interested in hearing how you come to the way that you think, and the frameworks, and the models that you all use for how you think about the world. So I'm curious if they're interested in further reading, further listening, what are some of the books or podcasts or any other content that influences your thinking? Cem, you want to start that?

Cem Karacadag: I honestly don't have a lot of time to read a lot. Ricardo's the reader, I'm the historian, as he's very aptly demonstrated, and believe me, it's something that's not special that he is doing here, he does it every day and very impressively. But I will reference this book authored by the name that Acemoglu, that Acemoglu that Ricardo quoted a little while ago. He quoted an article, I brought the book, and we're not coordinated on this, and this is the Why Nations Fail. Published in 2012. In fact, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson won the Nobel Prize for their work last year, Nobel Prize in economics. And the thesis being really is the institutions, the structure, these things matter the most, and the US is no exception incidentally, the freedom of expression and choice, the checks and balances, and independence of institutions, because those are the things that provide the stability for two very, very important things. One, so we save, and two, so we invest, and that's what we need in order to prosper, to produce and consume. Economics is as simple as that, and when you fail to provide that environment, the right environment to save and to invest, you're not going to grow and you're not going to therefore have the income to consume. So this is the work that we live by, this is the lens by which we analyze countries that, again, Ricardo references earlier, but we do live by it, we do mean it, and we sure hope that the US doesn't change too much so that it continues to prosper as it has.

Greg Campion: Okay, cool. Why Nations Fail, we will link to that one in the show notes, not to be confused with, I think Ray Dalio has a new book out with a similar title, but we'll link to that in the show notes. Ricardo, what do you got for us?

Ricardo Adrogue: So I have two books and one short article. One is The Road to Character, highly recommended, the author I'm blanking is a good known journalist. The Road to Character.

Greg Campion: Road to Character.

Ricardo Adrogue: It's seven or eight biographies of renowned historical figures and how they reflect a different culture than the one we have in the current society, which is very, very interesting, highly recommended. The book I'm reading now is on Herbert Hoover, President of the United States, well, that was present when the Great Depression happened. Very interesting character, there's a lot of similarities with different aspects of the current administration. And the third one is a very short article in The Financial Times by Mario Draghi about the Euro. It was published two or three days ago about Mario Draghi saying that forget about the tariffs that Trump is about to impose, Europe is imposing tariffs in itself. I think it summarizes all the work that he had done on why Europe is so uncompetitive in a much more briefer, and more concise, and more readable way than the big word that he published, which is very difficult to read and boring.

Greg Campion: Fantastic. Well, the right answer was Streaming Income- A Podcast from Barings, but those are great content recommendations as well. So we'll link to all of those in the show notes. Guys, this has been great, it's been a really hopefully helpful discussion for our listeners to hear how you guys are thinking about all these headlines that we're getting blitzed with every day and trying to make some sense of. So really appreciate your time and maybe we can do it again in person sometime soon.

Cem Karacadag: Sounds good, looking forward to it.

Greg Campion: Thanks for listening to or watching this episode of Streaming Income. If you'd like to stay up to date on our latest thoughts on asset classes ranging from high yield and private credit to real estate debt and equity, make sure to follow us and leave a review on your favorite podcast platform. We're on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and more. And if you have specific feedback, you can email us at podcast @ barings. com. That's podcast @ B- A- R- I- N- G- S. com. Thanks again for listening and see you next time.